Fandom – Page 9

Pick a Lane

Much has been written about organizations not caring enough to field a competitive team. In an effort to combat this scourge, the players tried to impose a salary floor in the latest CBA negotiations to thwart the concept of “tanking.” Shortly after the new CBA was signed, the Oakland A’s, doing their best Major League impression, went into fire-sale mode, bringing their 2022 salary commitments down to around $50M. The Orioles are in year pi of their rebuild. The Pirates are so parsimonious that the Effectively Wild podcast has dubbed any failure to pay players “Nutting” (after Pirates owner Bob Nutting).

We desperately need 30 teams to go out there and compete, to try to win.

We want teams to try to win, but, apparently, just not too hard. Based on what I have read and listened to since the start of the season, we don’t necessarily want our teams to try to win when doing so may come at the cost of individual achievements. We don’t want them to try to win when doing so might make the other team (or their fans) feel bad. We don’t want them to try to win when doing so might cause a violation of the so-called “unwritten rules.” To which I say, “Pick a lane.” What do we want?

The season is just a few weeks old, and we have already seen these issues rear their head on three occasions. Let’s take a look:

Clayton Kershaw & Dave Roberts

At this point, Clayton Kershaw is a national treasure. Love or hate the Dodgers, no one dislikes Kersh. The guy builds orphanages in Zambia; he hosts a ping-pong tournament each year to raise funds for Africa and the Dominican Republic. Oh, and he has had a Hall of Fame career, winning three Cy Youngs. However, the last few seasons have seen Kershaw make multiple trips to the IL with various ailments. His best days are behind him, but when healthy, he is still effective; and he is still someone the Dodgers will need in order to make a deep run in October.

So when Kershaw threw seven perfect innings, on only 80 pitches, in his first start of the season, baseball fans begged for him to keep going. But Clayton knows his body; Dave Roberts knows his star; and neither thought it made any long-term sense to send Kershaw back out there for the 8th inning. We fans were denied a shot at history; but so, too, was Kershaw. He didn’t seem to mind. But talk-radio jockeys, beat writers, and armchair managers all felt they knew better.

“He may never get another chance at a perfect game; you’ve got to let him go” was one refrain. “So what if he got tired? He could skip his next start or two,” was another. This latter take was maddeningly myopic. Suffice it to say that pushing an oft-injured, 34-year-old pitcher after a shortened Spring Training beyond what he felt he was ready for in his first start of the season just for the chance he would make history, is not good for the player or the team. Any potential injury could and would have a long-lasting impact on the Dodgers’ goal…of winning.

But, to hear “fans” lament “modern baseball” and it being ruled by “analytics” and “front offices” (a) takes away Kershaw’s agency in the matter (before the game he told Dave Robert he could only throw 85 pitches) and (b) flies in the face of the ultimate goal. How many Dodger fans would be happy exalting a perfect game in April, but being one pitcher – one Hall of Fame pitcher – short come the (expanded) playoffs? How would those “fans” feel when the Dodgers were forced to throw a bullpen game in Game 6 of the NLCS because Kershaw is on the shelf? I don’t love every decision Dave Roberts makes, but this one was one of his easiest.

Miguel Cabrera & Aaron Boone

If Kershaw is the most beloved player in MLB, Miguel Cabrera could make a case for being 1A. Who doesn’t love this guy? Hell, he gave his glove to rookie Spencer Torkelson, telling him to play first base while Cabrera moved permanently to DH, so Torkelson could start his big league career. Jayson Stark laid out the insanity of Cabrera’s hitting prowess, and the rarified air he breaths for those who have played the game and swung a bat.

And with three hits last Wednesday night, Cabrera entered Thursday’s game sitting on 2,999 hits. After going 0-fer in his first three at-bats, he came to the plate with two outs in the eighth inning of a 1-0 game, with runners on second and third. Aaron Boone had the Yankees trailing by a run with one of the greatest right-handed hitters in the history of the sport at bat, facing a lefty with a left-handed hitter on deck. So Boone did exactly the right thing: he intentionally walked Cabrera. The fans at Comerica Park went nuts. Even Cameron Maybin, in the Yankees’ broadcast booth, was shocked that Boone did it – but he agreed with the decision. You know why, because that is what you do when your job – and your goal – is to win games.

The AL East stands to be the most competitive division in all of baseball this season, where every win will be of paramount importance – and potentially the difference between making the playoffs and not. So, was Boone supposed to push that aside and let Cabrera swing away, potentially getting hit number 3,000, AND giving the Tigers a 3-0 lead? Would Brian Cashman and/or Hal Steinbrenner have looked the other way at that obvious malfeasance if/when the Yankees lose the prize by a single game?

The naysayers will say that Austin Meadows’ softly-hit double proved the Baseball Gods right, so it did not matter. But process matters. Good judgment matters. Bosses and owners can live with bad results that derive from good decisions. They can’t abide by putting the feelings of the hometown Tiger fans ahead of the goals of the team. And you know how I know I am right? When the inning ended the fans booed, Miguel Cabrera told them all to be quiet, to look at the scoreboard, to recognize that Aaron Boone made the right call.

Mauricio Dubon & Gabe Kapler

About a week ago the Giants started thumping their division rivals, the Padres, from the get-go. By the time there were two outs in the second inning, they led 10-2. Steven Duggar, who had just knocked in the tenth run with a single, elected to steal second base. Swiping a base with a nine-run lead is not de rigueur, but doing so in the second inning may be slightly more palatable. If the Padres were upset with Duggar, they hadn’t seen anything yet.

Leading off the bottom of the sixth, with the Giants comfortably ahead 11-2, Mauricio Dubon bunted for a single. When he got to first base, Eric Hosmer greeted him with some choice words. Hosmer told MLB.com that he told Dubon: “You’ve been playing professional ball for a good amount of time obviously if you’re at this level. You’ve got to be smarter than that.”

Smarter than what? Smarter than trying to play the game to win? Smarter than trying to increase his batting average so he will get a raise next season, and maybe more money when he reaches arbitration in a few years? Sure, the Giants were up nine runs, but Hosmer was still trying to win when he swung from his heels the inning before. The Padres were trailing by nine runs but still had their starters in the game (Bob Melvin did replace Hosmer and Manny Machado in the seventh). Clearly, one side was still playing to win. Why shouldn’t the other?

After the game, reporters threw a ton of mics in manager Gabe Kapler’s face, trying to get an answer as to what he and his players were thinking. Kapler (who it should be noted, I don’t always agree with), laid it out perfectly:

“Our goal is not exclusively to win one game in a series. It’s to try to win the entire series. Sometimes, that means trying to get a little deeper into the opposition’s ’pen…We’re not trying to hurt anybody. We just want to score as many runs as possible, force the other pitcher to throw as many pitches as possible. If other clubs decide that they want to do the same thing to us, we’re not going to have any issue with it.”

And there it is. Kapler is paid to help his team win games. If his strategy in game one of a series has an impact on games two and three, all the better. Last season the Giants won the division over the Dodgers by one game. Every game – including the games in the days after a blowout – counts. Were the Padres upset? Yes. Should they have been? Well, I do seem to recall a certain Padres star swinging on a 3-0 pitch with the bases loaded up by seven runs just a few years ago.

The “unwritten rules” of baseball aren’t worth the paper they aren’t written on – they take away the competitive spirit of the game (with the exception of throwing at someone’s head – that one actually should be written in stone).

In that same interview, Kapler spoke the truth and summed up the ultimate goal:

“Everybody is competing on a Major League Baseball field. It doesn’t make any sense how one part of the field stops competing and the other part of the field keeps competing. I can’t think of a reason why that makes sense. The pitcher on the mound is trying to get you out, the batter at the plate stops competing with all the tools at his disposal?”

Baseball is hard. Ask the heralded rookies over the past two seasons all hitting below the Mendoza Line. Ask the Blue Jays who didn’t make the playoffs last season despite possibly being the best team in the American League at season’s end. Ask the aforementioned Giants who won the division by a single robbed home run in May, only to be knocked out of the playoffs on a checked swing.

The goal is to win and to put your team in the best possible position to win. The goal is not to make the fans happy with individual achievements at the potential cost of long-term success; nor is it to mollify opposing managers who believe there is a “right way” to play the game. If we demand that our owners spend money to put quality players on the field, then we have to demand that our managers allow those players to play the game to win, both for today and for October. Otherwise, we are just a jumbled mess of contradictions and hypocrisy. So look in the mirror, baseball fans, and ask yourself what it is that you want.

Either way, you need to pick a lane!

PLAY BALL!!

MLB Labor Negotiations: Moving Mountains

From the moment word came down that the owners and players had reached an agreement and the MLB lockout would be lifted, baseball writers all over the country took to their keyboards to bang out stories about the new CBA.

Jeff Passan, weary and exhausted, the victim of a Twitter hack, was able to hash out a quick summary of the deal.

Jayson Stark did another of his many-thousand-word summaries.

Evan Drellich, who followed this process as closely as anyone, wrote a great piece about how and what the players won. But I don’t think he went far enough.

What the MLBPA was able to achieve after a 99-day lockout was nothing short of monumental.

Did they get everything they wanted at the outset? Of course not. Did they fundamentally alter the financial landscape of the game? No, but that was never in the offing. Unfortunately, in the excitement of “a deal” and players reporting to Spring Training and the season being salvaged, I believe many of the changes they were able to achieve are either being overlooked or elided.

When negotiations got really heated late last month, Michael Bauman of The Ringer tweeted that it is hard to negotiate with a party when their singular response is “Fuck you, that’s why.” And that, truly, is what the players were up against. As has been written time and again – whether or not it is true may be immaterial – neither Rob Manfred nor the owners who employ him seem to like baseball. They may like owning their teams, and the reflective glory of being 1 of 30; they may like the tax benefits that come from owning a unique civic institution; they may like the centerpiece of their real estate portfolio, the item that draws people to their parking lots, hotels, and other “around the ballpark” destinations. But the game itself, and the players who make it great, well, whatever.

Oh, and they have billions of dollars. And most – if not all – have alternative revenue sources from which to pay their mortgages and fund their vacations. But the players – save for a few who have potentially lucrative hobbies on the side (looking at you Ross Stripling) – have baseball, and only baseball. And they only have that for a limited period of time. And the period of time during which they can be fairly compensated has been lessened by the owners repeated insistence on artificially deflating salaries and/or the ability to spend.

The Long Road to Riches

When a player gets drafted, he doesn’t get to pick his team, and “slots” restrain his signing bonus. That player is beholden to that organization for years in the minor leagues making below-poverty wages. Once he reaches the majors, he is skilled enough to be (arguably) one of the best 750 in the world at his profession, and yet is paid a minimum salary for at least three years. After those three years, if he is still employed, he is forced to not only advocate for himself in an arbitration proceeding, but he is forced to listen to a fully-fleshed out assault on his worth, his value, and the team’s desire to keep him employed. And after three years of running that gauntlet, he is afforded “free agency,” where teams now tell him he is too old, his most productive years are behind him, that teams don’t pay for past performance, and/or they would but for that pesky Competitive Balance Tax, which has thwarted the team’s ability to pay your market value. Sorry!!

Here is where we insert the “poor baseball players…they get paid to play a kid’s game and, at worst, make more than ten times the US median income in any given year” trope. But when you think they have just a few years to make that salary, and then the rest of their lives to live (who amongst us is considered old for our profession once we turn 30, let alone 35?), the players’ plight is not that outrageous.

And that is all a red herring. Professional athletes’ salaries should not ever be measured against lunch pail carrying Joes and Janes. They, by virtue of their talents, are simply different. No one pays $50 plus parking to watch me negotiate contracts all day – just sayin’.

The Long Road to Change

With that as the backdrop, the players went about doing the absolute best they could – and for the right people. The negotiations were centered (not exclusively) on the youngest players and those in the middle class. Max Scherzer and his $43M/year and Marcus Semien and his 7/$175M deal sat at that negotiating table and fought for everyone else. And when the owners said, “Fuck you, that’s why,” and then locked out the players to “jump-start negotiations” and then didn’t offer a response for six weeks, and then began setting artificial deadlines to finalize the deal or the players would begin losing paychecks, the players had to pick their battles and fight the fights they could win.

They did better than that.

Set forth below, in simple terms, is what the players were able to achieve in the face of complete intransigence and an apparent total lack of care:

I. Minimum Salary

Who amongst us wouldn’t like to get a 23% raise? The players were able to increase the minimum salary (in year one) from $570,500 to $700,000. To put this in context, roughly one-third of the league made the minimum salary last season, and 62% had salaries of less than $1M. This change alone may ultimately impact more players than any of the other issues. It was a huge win.

II. Limitation on Options

Related to the minimum salary, but not getting nearly enough press, is the limitation of the number of times a player can be optioned to the minors in a given season. A team can now only do that five times. So, players like Tanner Houck of the Red Sox will not be optioned seven times, being sent down after each start during July and August. Houck accrued 64 days of service time and was paid approximately $275,000 – less than half the 2021 MLB minimum – even though he was one of Boston’s most effective pitchers. Will teams utilize all five? You bet. Will some players be stuck in the minors due to this limitation? No doubt. But, if a player is performing, and the team is trying to win, this will ultimately be a net positive for young players (especially pitchers).

III. Pre-Arbitration Bonus Pool

As if conjured out of thin air, the players were able to obtain an additional $250M for the players over the life of the deal. With the $50M/year pre-arbitration pool, exceptional players (and many not so exceptional players) will receive additional monies that simply never existed before.

The Jayson Stark article referenced above does a nice job of explaining who gets paid for what. To give this some context, when Pete Alonso won the 2019 Home Run Derby, he nearly tripled his salary. And by winning again in 2021, Alonso has now earned more from the Home Run Derby ($2M) than he has in three seasons with the Mets ($1.47M, due to his rookie contracts). Something about that just doesn’t seem right.

But with this new pool, players who are not yet eligible for arbitration will get paid bonuses for their performance. As Stark pointed out, Vlad Guerrero, Jr. would have netted an additional $1.75M last season (2nd in MVP voting), which is more than three times his salary. The $50M will be given for various awards, and then allocated amongst the best remaining 100 players (which means that even not-so-exceptional players will reap the benefit of this hard-fought MLBPA win).

IV. Thwarting Service Time Manipulation

Players who excel have a chance to thwart the owner’s ability to manipulate their service time. In fairness, this provision does not go far enough, nor will it truly compel teams to stop this heinous practice, but it does afford players like Kris Bryant (for whom this new rule is all but named) from getting hosed by teams utilizing financial calendars.

If a player finishes first or second in Rookie of the Year voting, he gets a full year of service time, whether he was rostered for 150 days, or 15. Would a team keep a player in the minors for so long that he has no realistic ability to win ROY, maybe – never underestimate the audacity of MLB front offices. But that would be a serious tank job, and a result that no amount of bargaining could ever eliminate, and one sure to be the topic of a grievance.

V. Universal Designated Hitter

It took 50 years for both the AL and the NL to have the same positions in their starting lineup every day. And while the addition of the designated hitter in the National League will most likely benefit older players rather than younger ones, as guys like Nelson Cruz and Albert Pujols will now be able to cash at least a few more checks before their lack of defense ends their careers, any change that essentially adds a roster spot is good for the game and potentially good for young and middle-class players.

VI. Expanded Playoffs

Increasing the playoff pool from 10 to 12 teams means an additional $85M in television money for the teams, which was sprinkled out to the players in the form of the increased minimum salary and higher CBT thresholds (more about those below). Now, baseball purists who were just digesting the Wild Card and the expanded Wild Card are having none of this, but the truth of the matter is that more playoff baseball is more baseball, and more baseball is good for baseball…and baseball players.

With the new format, there are four additional teams coming into your living room each October. With young (and old) players now afforded the chance to play on the biggest stage, in front of the largest viewing audience, they get more exposure and more opportunity for financial gain. Mike Trout may not need the playoffs to get another Subway sponsorship or increase his value, but Bobby Witt, Jr. sure might. And if the Royals can sneak into a 12-team playoff where they would have been left out of a 10-teamer, and the Midwesterner gets to play in primetime in the fall in front of millions of viewers – and millions of impressionable kids – and he performs as we all expect he will, well then Bobby, Jr. may be the guy to get the next Subway deal.

VII. Increased CBT Thresholds

I have covered this one last even though, by all accounts, it was the most contentious issue in the labor negotiations. Quite obviously, the increased amounts are a win for all players. For years teams have worried about exceeding the “soft cap,” so much so that only two exceeded it last year, and another half dozen double-checked their abaci to make certain that they spent within $5M without going over.

But now, with an additional $20M (in year one), teams may not be as concerned about throwing an extra million or two to that middle reliever who will be an asset down the stretch. And where this may become really beneficial (and which I have not seen written about), is teams’ willingness to make trades at the deadline. In years past, teams wouldn’t make a trade that jeopardized their CBT situation, even if it gave them a better chance to win. With that additional $20M to play with (more in later years of CBA), teams will have more wiggle room to take on salary and give their team a chance to play in the expanded playoffs…which will give players more exposure…which will open up additional opportunities…which will potentially be a financial boon (in fairness, to both the players and the owners).

Moving Mountains

The MLBPA moved mountains over the course of the past four months, but really in the past few weeks. They won the social media battle. They won the PR battle (Rob Manfred didn’t help the owners’ cause by lying about profitability, setting artificial deadlines, laughing at somber moments, and practicing his golf swing while players, ticket takers, and hot dog vendors were staring down the gauntlet of being out of work). And they won the negotiating battle. At no point did it seem that the owners wanted to make a deal. At every turn they threw up another obstacle: one day it was an international draft; the next it was refusing to take “yes” for an answer because it came past the 6 pm deadline; lastly, it was a requirement that the players drop two grievances against the owners as a condition to closing (one of which the players agreed to drop).

But in spite of all of that, the players held together and got way more than any reasonable observer would have thought possible. The players went into these negotiations with wide eyes and great aspirations. But they had to know, at a visceral level, that there were no 8-run homers available; they could not make up all of the ground lost in 2011 and 2016 in one CBA negotiation. They quickly made concessions where they could; they gave up on redefining the sport; they remained focused on protecting the most vulnerable amongst them. And by a vote of 26-12, they prevailed. Hopefully, one day, we will learn why all eight Executive Subcommittee members voted “no,” and why four other player reps felt the same. But, for now, the players won, and baseball is back.

And we, as fans, are nothing less than elated. But before we start booing Gerrit Cole for another lousy outing, or Manny Machado for not running out a grounder, remember the work that these guys did – collectively – to protect the sport. Because there were many times when it seemed like the players were the only people at the table who cared to do so.

Mountains were moved. And, as per usual, it was labor that did the work. I cannot wait to hear, on April 7th:

PLAY BALL!!

The Silver Age of First Basemen

There is a belief that your baseball fandom hits its stride between the ages of 12 and 14. That certainly holds true for me. And luckily for me, as a bats-left/throws-left first baseman, I hit my fandom stride in what I would call the “Silver Age” of first basemen. Why not the Golden Age? Because as good as the collection of first-sackers listed below are, I’m not sure they live up to an era that had Lou Gehrig, Jimmy Foxx, and Hank Greenberg.

Here is a non-comprehensive list of the veritable super-stars who held runners on base in the eighties:

Pete Rose: 4,256 hits; played for 24 years. Only not a Hall of Famer due to that pesky gambling thing.

Rod Carew: Retired in 1985 after more than 3,000 hits, with 13 seasons of 150 hits or more (four with 200 or more); 7 batting titles including four in row (1972-1975). Inducted into the Hall of Fame in 1991.

Eddie Murray: Between 1977 and 1995, had only one season with less than a 105 OPS+, and had a 103 OPS+ in his 21st year. He got a plaque in Cooperstown in 2003.

Jack Clark: You rarely hear his name any more, but from 1978 through 1991, his lowest OPS+ was 125, with five seasons above 150. Plus, he crushed the souls of Los Angelenos in the 1985 playoffs.

Wally Joyner: I already dedicated a whole article to him here.

Mark McGwire: Even before his goatee and biceps grew, he set a major league rookie record with 49 HRs in 1987. Would be in the Hall of Fame today but for Andro, Deca-Durabolin, and Winstrol.

Mark Grace: No batting gloves, no matter. 2,445 hits, lifetime .303 hitter, career OBP of .383. And how about this line for the 1989 playoffs: .647/.682/1.118/1.799.

There are four very obvious names not listed above, all of whom hold a very special place in my heart; all of whom were cornerstones of ‘80s baseball:

My inaugural first-baseman’s mitt was a Rawlings Keith Hernandez model.

Before the Batting Stance Guy ever struck his first pose, I closed my stance and dropped the head of the bat over my shoulder – and even removed my batting gloves – just like Will Clark.

My first baseball coach was a diehard Yankee fan. The only thing we could agree on was that Don Mattingly was the best hitter in the league.

Steve Garvey defied what I looked for in a first baseman – he batted and threw (I use that word loosely) right-handed – but he was my hometown guy; and he played every…single…day; and he could stretch like a Russian ballerina, and picked every errant Bill Russell throw.

These guys were not only good, they were great. As such, each year, when Hall of Fame balloting comes around, all four get a ton of attention. There are some who will swear that if Player X is in the Hall of Fame, so too should Garvey. Others will say that Mattingly was well on his way, but a bad back thwarted his potential enshrinement. Some claim that cocaine slowed Hernandez down. As for Will, well, he’ll always be a Hall of Famer…in my heart, if not in my head.

But the truth is, despite their greatness for periods of time, and despite my unrequited love, none of these four guys had Hall of Fame careers. Sure, that can be a subjective analysis (ahem, Harold Baines, ahem), but the facts and the stats bear this out.

Each player included at www.baseballreference.com has a “Hall of Fame Statistics” section, which lists the following:

Black Ink: This is how many times the player led the league in “important” stats. Accordingly, you get four points for leading in HRs, RBI, and/or batting average; three points for runs, hits, and/or slugging; two points for doubles, walks, and/or stolen bases; one point for games, at bats, and/or triples. The average Black Ink points for a Hall of Fame first baseman is 27.

Gray Ink: This is the same as Black Ink, but the player need only be in the top ten of the league. The average Gray Ink points for a Hall of Fame first baseman is 144.

Hall of Fame Standards: This is a considerably more complicated math problem, with 17 different inputs. You can read more about it here. The average Hall of Fame Standard point total for a Hall of Famer is 50 (with 100 being the max).

WAR: This is also known as bWAR, and it is Baseball Reference’s calculation to determine how much better a player is than a player that would typically be available to replace that player. I will save you the headache of explaining how they do this.

JAWS: This is the preeminent tool for determining if a player is Hall-worthy. The sabermetrician Jay Jaffe first developed this system in 2004, comparing players at each position with players already enshrined, using advanced metrics to account for the wide variations in offensive levels throughout the game’s history. The JAWS score is a player’s career WAR averaged with his seven-year peak (not necessarily consecutive).

With that as the backdrop, let’s dig into the numbers.

	Black Ink	Gray Ink	HOF	WAR	7-Year Peak WAR	JAWS
Average HOF First Baseman	27	144	50	65.5	42.1	53.8
Steve Garvey	12	142	32	38	28.7	33.4
Keith Hernandez	14	118	32	60.3	41.2	50.8
Don Mattingly	23	111	34	42.4	35.7	39.1
Will Clark	13	94	42	56.5	36.1	46.3

As you can see from the above metrics, none of these guys meet the criteria necessary to have plaques in Cooperstown. And despite the oft-heard “Garvey was a Hall of Famer” (on the field and in the bedroom), it appears that Keith Hernandez has the strongest case to ultimately be enshrined. His WAR is only 8% lower than the average; his 7-Year Peak WAR is within the margin of error; and his JAWS score should be close enough for government work (especially for a guy who played and now broadcasts in New York).

What is incredible about these numbers is that you would have sworn that for at least a seven-year window, both Don Mattingly and Will Clark were the best hitters in the world. And yet, the statistics belie that memory. I guess that is just nostalgia of my youth. Chuck Klosterman, the best-selling author who always has an interesting way of looking at things, recently said the following: “Nostalgia is looking at the past through the lens of your own personal experience and therefore changing the meaning of that memory based on the way you want to feel about your relationship to your own life.”

In my own life, I want Garvey, Hernandez, Mattingly, and Clark to be inducted into the Hall of Fame. In real life, they were good; they were, in-fact, great. They were part of the Silver-Era of first basemen. But try as I might, I cannot conjure them into being Hall of Famers. And, you know what, my memories will suffice.

Garvey’s chiseled jaw and dimpled chin perfectly placed on his front shoulder awaiting the pitch.

Hernandez’s mad-dash charge of a bunt.

Donny Baseball’s six grand slams in 1987.

Will the Thrill’s bat drop/arm cock as he launched another one into the upper deck at Candlestick.

Who needs plaques when I have those images burned into my brain.

PLAY BALL!!

How Do You Explain PEDs and the Hall of Fame?

Read enough newspapers or watch enough news or listen to enough podcasts, and you are bound to get slapped in the face with poor reportage. It’s the law of big numbers. But, as a discerning baseball fan, I have come to expect that, while I may not agree with all baseball takes and opinions, I believe they come from an informed and considered place. Football analysts shoot from the hip, basketball commentators like to make headlines, but baseball observers are more careful. Or so I believed.

After the Hall of Fame released the results of the BBWAA vote last month, I listened to “The Athletic Baseball Show” podcast hosted by Ken Rosenthal. He had a murderer’s row of guests, and I knew there would be much to discuss regarding Roger Clemens, Barry Bonds, Curt Schilling, and A-Rod, and, of course, the election of David Ortiz. The show lived up to my expectations up to about the 2:40 mark, when guest Britt Ghiroli said the following:

“Well, David Ortiz still has some ties to PEDs, so how can you let him in and not let Clemens and Barry Bonds in?” And then she referenced a tweet by pitcher Kevin Gausman who asked, “How do you explain this?” And she then opined that a lot of people are left wondering, “How do you explain this?”

Now, this is by no means intended to be a pile on Ghiroli. I think she is a fantastic reporter and writer, and I find her articles thoughtful and insightful. That said, this issue is not hard to explain. And I was disappointed that not only did Ghiroli not clarify the situation, she perpetuated the question; she gave it life and further validity.

To be fair, I was equally disappointed with Rosenthal, who offered no rebuttal, no explanation. This was all unfortunate, because it is very easy (although slightly time-consuming) to explain. Since neither Ghiroli nor Rosenthal did so, I will.

2003 Anonymous Steroid Testing

In 2003 MLB conducted a random, anonymous test to get a loose idea of who was taking what. Coming off the “chicks dig the long ball era,” with Mark McGwire and Sammy Sosa imitating a modern-day Maris and Mantle — just doing it every year — and then with Barry Bonds asking both of them to hold his beer, MLB decided to dip its toe into the murky PED waters.

The results of that test were supposed to remain anonymous; but intent didn’t matter once the names began to leak. Ortiz’s name was included on a list of 104 players who tested positive … for something. The findings (i.e., what was discovered) were never disclosed and the urine samples have been destroyed (convenient, I know). At the time the names were leaked, the MLB Players’ Association said that 13 of the samples were in dispute, but they didn’t say which ones.

Years later, Commissioner Rob Manfred stated that the inclusion of at least 10 names on the list could be doubted for “legitimate scientific reasons.” He didn’t elaborate, other than to say, “even if you were on that list, it was entirely possible that you were not a positive” (emphasis added). Manfred put a button on the issue by stating that he felt it would be unfair for Hall of Fame voters to use that positive test against Ortiz.

David Ortiz’s Career

When the 2003 test was conducted, Ortiz was entering his seventh year in the big leagues. He had previous highs of 20 home runs and an .839 OPS. Drug testing began in earnest in 2004, with at least two tests per year: one during Spring Training and one during the season, with the possibility of additional random tests as, when, and where determined by MLB. Assuming Ortiz was never called out for additional checks (which he claims he was), he was tested for steroids at least 26 times between 2004 and when he retired. During that span, he hit 452 home runs, and averaged a .956 OPS. And do you know how many times he tested positive for PEDs? To quote Jayson Stark, “That would be none.”

Spring Trainings and regular seasons, playoffs and World Series. The world was watching every swing he took and every ball he crushed. And yet, other than his name appearing on an anonymous list in 2003, not a whiff of scandal, nary a scintilla of evidence of cheating. Those are the “ties” Ghiroli referenced.

Since Ghiroli mentioned Ortiz in the same breath as Clemens and Bonds, let’s take a look at what makes them different, let’s try to “explain it.”

Roger Clemens

In 2006, then-Commissioner Bud Selig appointed former senator George Mitchell to investigate the use of PEDs in baseball. Clemens’ former strength and conditioning coach, Brian McNamee, told the Mitchell Commission that he provided performance-enhancing drugs to Clemens. But an MLB commission — even one run by a former senator — is not great stakes. So it carried considerably more weight when McNamee put his hand on a bible and testified in front of Congress, and said the same thing.

Sure, McNamee could have been lying. But McNamee also testified that he provided HGH to Clemens’ teammate, Andy Pettitte, and Pettitte later acknowledged that to be true (and apologized for his use). After McNamee’s testimony, Clemens was charged with perjury and obstruction of Congress. Because of the he-said-he-said nature of the matter, Clemens was ultimately found not guilty. But that didn’t stop Clemens and McNamee from filing defamation cases against each other. Clemens’ suit against his former trainer was tossed out and McNamee’s case against Clemens was settled, with Clemens’ insurance company picking up the tab. Both men will likely go to their grave claiming they are right, righteous, and full of rectitude. But only one of these men had a bona fide reason to lie.

Regardless, in contrast to Ortiz, there were credible allegations — made in multiple courts of law and to Congress — that Clemens utilized PEDs during seasons in which he won two of his seven Cy Young Awards (at ages 36 and 39). The main witness who testified against Clemens was proven to be truthful by none other than Clemens’ best friend and former teammate. Those facts seem markedly different from a name on a list. That’s how you explain it.

Barry Bonds

In 2003, Greg Anderson, Bonds’ trainer, was indicted by a federal grand jury and charged with supplying steroids to a number of athletes. Bonds was called to testify before the grand jury, and he admitted to utilizing “the clear” and “the cream,” but claimed they were nutritional supplements, not illegal drugs. Prosecutors did not believe this testimony, and asked Anderson to testify in front of another grand jury to determine if Bonds had committed perjury. Anderson refused — even though a search of Anderson’s home found drug records, including some with Bonds’ name on them — was held in contempt of court, and taken away to jail.

Bonds was indicted for perjury and obstruction of justice, and was convicted on the obstruction charge. That conviction was ultimately overturned by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on the grounds that Bonds gave a “rambling, non-responsive answer to a simple question” and that there was insufficient evidence that the statement was material to the investigation. It is important to note what the appeals court didn’t say: Bonds told the truth.

Anderson started training Bonds in 2000, the same year that Bonds set his then-career high in home runs with 49. The next year he hit a record-breaking 73 (at age 37). The following three seasons he hit 46, 45, and 45 (at age 40). Prior to engaging Anderson’s services, Bonds’ season high in home runs was 46, in his age-28 season. Bonds had a then-career high OPS that same season of 1.136. Nearly a decade later, after he started working with Anderson, Bonds had OPS seasons of 1.127, 1.379, 1.381, 1.278, and 1.422.

Bonds’ alleged PED use was the topic of the best-selling 2006 book entitled Game of Shadows, written by San Francisco Chronicle writers Mark Fainaru-Wada and Lance Williams. It should be noted that Bonds sued the authors and publisher of the book not for defamation, but over their use of grand jury documents. Bonds didn’t try to clear his name, he didn’t sue in open court that his reputation was in tatters due to vicious lies. Rather, he tried to block the authors and publisher from profiting from ill-gotten grand jury documents.

In contrast to Ortiz, whose name was on a single list leaked to a New York Times reporter, and who the Commissioner has somewhat exonerated, Bonds was involved in multiple state and federal lawsuits, leading to his (overturned) conviction. He was tied to the conviction of at least two of his associates (Anderson and Victor Conte, the owner and founder of BALCO). His name appears in drug files, journals, and affidavits. Although he never failed an MLB drug test, according to the aforementioned indictment, Bonds tested positive for anabolic steroids and other PEDs. I’m sure that Ghiroli, and Rosenthal, know all of this. Yet, they couldn’t “explain it.”

I am not here to say that Clemens or Bonds should or should not be in the Hall of Fame; that was up to the BBWAA writers (and now the Today’s Game Era Committee). What I am here to say is that we — as a society, and with all things — must stop the common practice of false equivalence. Not everything is equal; not all situations are the same.

It is imperative that those we trust with reporting the “facts” understand this, do their research, and be prepared to offer thoughtful and detailed rebuttals when lesser antagonists or clickbait wannabes try to say otherwise. This was a layup for Ghiroli and Rosenthal. They knew the topic ahead of time. No one expects reporters to be perfect, but we expect them to be prepared. Two writers who I truly respect both whiffed, and we are all worse off because of it.

Ortiz was elected to the Hall of Fame because enough writers believed that having your name on a list well before your career took off, followed by nothing but cleanliness as you built your Hall of Fame credentials, is not disqualifying. Clemens and Bonds were not elected to the Hall of Fame because the sum total of the allegations made against them — in court, before Congress, under oath, in affidavits, and in other testimony — was disqualifying.

Britt, Ken, Kevin, that is how you explain it. And please don’t get me started on A-Rod.

PLAY BALL!!

MLB’s Middle-Class Isn’t So Middling

I have a great deal of ambivalence about the current lockout. I am, by no means, pro-owner. But that doesn’t mean I am necessarily pro-player, either. And I am really tired of the trite trope of billionaires vs. millionaires. Both sides are right and wrong. Unfortunately, the most intransigent issues are financial, with the players wanting to be paid more, and the owners wanting to pay less. That makes for tough sledding.

There are, of course, many issues on the table beyond the aforementioned financial ones, and those should be considered and fought for as vociferously as the ones related to pay. In fact, possibly even more so. Over the past few seasons, and in the lead-up to the lockout, there was a great deal of focus on the middle-class of players, who are being pushed aside for rookies and their minimum salaries, rather than being paid in the free-agent market. We, as fans, have been told that we are heading down the NBA road of rooting for teams comprised of stars and scrubs, with no in-between. The system is flawed. But how flawed? Who isn’t getting paid?

Last month I wrote about teams giving out raises to players when they have no contractual or, quite frankly, moral obligation to do so. I don’t see the MLBPA complaining about that. For those interested in that story, the article can be found here.

Despite all of the sturm and drang about middle-class players getting squeezed, the numbers don’t necessarily bear that out.

A quick primer: Typically, a player is under team control for the first three seasons, wherein the club can pay that player any salary at or above the minimum. After the player’s third season, the team can: (1) not offer the player a contract, effectively cutting him (known as “non-tendering”); (2) negotiate a new contract, either for one or multiple years (it is normally for one year); or (3) go to arbitration, where a neutral third party decides between the player’s proffered salary and the team’s (in “Baseball Arbitration,” there is no baby to split, it is one or the other).

It is hard to calculate how many arbitration-eligible players suffer the fate of option (1) above. There may be many. But for those to whom no contract is tendered, we can stipulate that the player is either really bad or simply not worth the money. Maybe those players should be squeezed out of the market/league.

If no deal is reached (option (2) above), then the player and team go to arbitration, which is an arduous and somewhat antiquated process. It forces an adversarial confrontation between two parties who, regardless of the outcome, will be on the same side, fighting the same battles, hoping to achieve the same goals, as soon as the proceedings end. It is a zero-sum exercise for a non-zero-sum relationship.

With the lockout, the arbitration process is on hold. But prior to December 2, 36 players settled their contract status with teams before going to arbitration (i.e., option (2) above). I analyzed each one of those 36.

Players are correct in their thinking that – in the aggregate – the competitive balance tax is being used as a soft salary cap (only the Dodgers and Padres paid the CBT this past season). They are also correct that – in the aggregate – more and more teams are spending less (i.e., tanking) to procure better draft pick placement (total spending in 2021 was down 4% from 2019, and was at its lowest level since 2015). But before the players die on this hill, before they allow the 2022 season to be truncated, resulting in missed paychecks, they need to look at the state of the state, and how players are being compensated.

And, to reiterate, this analysis does not involve free agents, so we can take Max Scherzer and his $43M AAV and Corey Seager and his 10/$325M contract out of the equation. This is just players who teams thought enough of to tender contracts, fearing the heavy hand of an arbitrator. Based on the value of these deals, either owners are very risk-averse or the arbitration system is totally out of control (such that teams fear the outcomes). But either way, these middle-class players are not getting squeezed.

In every case but two, when the players settled, they got a raise. You may think, “okay, we all get an annual raise” (or so we hope). Well, the average raise for these 36 players was 66.6%. Do you get an annual raise of 66.6%?

And I wish I could report that a few massive deals throw this calculation out whack. Nope. The median was 46.5%. One player – Seranthony Dominguez – took a 0.3% pay-cut. That may be because he didn’t pitch last season due to Tommy John surgery. One player – Guillermo Heredia and his 0.3 bWAR – remained static at $1M. The other 34 got PAID.

So now you may be thinking, “well, those other players were most likely very deserving of raises, and it’s not my money, so pay the man.” That would be a fair guess, but far from the truth. Despite the players’ argument that mid-level players are being shoved aside for rookies who can do the job cheaper, the facts – at least in these cases – show something very different.

Of the contracts reviewed, three players received raises in the 4.1%-6.4% range; three players in the 12%-19% range; one player received a 22.7% raise. The highest bWAR of any of these players: Noe Ramirez and his 0.8.

Of the 14 players receiving raises between 30.6% and 59.4%, only one had a bWAR of more than 1.0 (Lucas Luetge’s 1.5).

But it gets better/worse. Of the players analyzed, the average raise for a player with a negative bWAR was virtually the same as the entire control group: 66.7%. You read that correctly. There were 8 players with negative bWAR – meaning that if a replacement player came along, that replacement player would actually be better than those who received raises. I am quite certain that the MLBPA will not be touting these contracts when lamenting the fate of the middle-class player.

This topic struck my fancy due to a single contract. All season long, as Cody Bellinger got hurt, then hurt again, and then looked totally lost at the plate, the question du jour was “will the Dodgers cut Bellinger?” At season’s end, by bWAR, Bellinger was the fifth-worst player – out of 1369 – in MLB. Now, one season may be an aberration. And he was coming off two injuries that sapped his power. But not his eyesight. And not our eyesight. And, if additional information is needed, here are Bellinger’s wRC+ numbers (with 100 being average) over the past three seasons: 2019: 161 (5th best); 2020: 113 (67th best); 2021: 48 (223rd out of 224 players with at least 350 PA).

But okay, Bellinger is a mainstay in Los Angeles. He plays above-average outfield defense, can fill in at first base, and has speed on the bases. He was a Rookie of the Year and won a World Series and an MVP. So, of course, you tender him a contract and be prepared to go to arbitration. Bellinger was paid $16.1M to compile -1.5 bWAR in 2021. What argument could he possibly make to get a raise for 2022? What arbitrator would have agreed that Bellinger shouldn’t be happy with, at best, the status quo.

I could argue that the Dodgers could and should have offered him $5M and told him to take or leave it. But that is not what happened. Instead, the Dodgers gave Bellinger a raise. Sure, it was on the lower end of the raises in this control group, but it was still a 5.6% bump, which equates to an additional $900K for 2022. Again, this is small by baseball measures, but completely unwarranted. If Bellinger is getting nearly an additional $1M for stinking up the joint all year, who doesn’t get a raise?

More than $1,700,000,000 in contracts were doled out in November prior to the lockout. A cynic might say that the owners did this to soften the players’ argument about salary depression, but that is a seriously risky bet. A different cynic might say that by agreeing to so much prior to the lockout, that there will be very little left when negotiations resume (whenever that happens). But regardless, the deals that have been signed, including those referenced above and the 6 nine-figure deals closed prior to the lockout, cannot be taken back, they are a fait accompli, those players are not getting squeezed, they are getting paid, and paid handsomely.

As we head deeper into this lockout, with pitchers and catchers due to report in less than a month and no progress made on a new collective bargaining agreement, I would hope that the MLBPA focuses on battles they can win with facts and not emotion. There is no reason the Mets should pay a player (Scherzer) more than the total roster for an entire MLB team (Orioles). Teams like the Rangers, Diamondbacks, and Tigers cannot justify having less than $100M in committed contracts, so a salary floor makes sense. So too does a higher CBT threshold. And if the players can raise that tide, it will, ostensibly, raise other boats. Then crack down on service time manipulation, expand the playoffs, make the DH universal, and call it a day/deal.

Get back to the bargaining table with achievable goals, based on real numbers, not perceptions, so that on March 31st we can hear an umpire yell:

PLAY BALL!!

Do Raises Buy Goodwill?

For those of us who follow baseball closely – and one must assume that if you are reading this, you do – we take for granted our knowledge of the business of the game. We know, at a subconscious level, when a player will be eligible for free agency, and what “service time manipulation” means. We understand the significance of opt-outs and the nuances of the competitive balance tax. But the truth is, all of these things that we can recite as easily as “2+2,” are quite arcane to the casual observer. Want proof? Try explaining “Super Two Status” to someone who doesn’t frequent FanGraphs or follow Pitching Ninja on Twitter.

A while back I found myself having drink with my wife, waiting for a table at a local restaurant. A game was playing on the television above the bar. Some player was on the screen – I don’t recall who, but it could have been Walker Buhler or Fernando Tatís (pre-extension) or Rafael Devers. The who is irrelevant. I said to wife something along the lines of: “This guy is one of the best bargains in baseball.” She asked, “Why is that?” And so began a long and complicated discussion about rookie deals, the tendering of contracts, arbitration, and then free agency. Either I explained it very well or she is a quick study, or she is a good enough actress to pretend she understood even when she was too bored to ask for additional details. But she did stump me with one simple question:

If the teams control players for three years before they reach arbitration, why would the teams ever give them a raise?

In response I gave a trite answer about how we all want to be rewarded for our hard work, asking how would we feel if our bosses didn’t give us raises on yearly basis. It was such an innocent question. But it raised such an interesting point.

As ordinary shmos, we want and need to be rewarded for our hard work and we expect a raise each year. Our employers – ostensibly – want to keep us as employees, knowing that the time and cost of replacing a worker is substantial (as companies have learned during the “great resignation”). There is mutuality to the relationship in a standard setting that does not exist in professional sports. If an employer treats its employees well, pays them a decent wage (with reasonable bumps), and provides them with adequate benefits, that employee will theoretically stay. But regardless of how well a team treats a player, he has an off-ramp; a time when he can, and oftentimes is expected to, take his talents to South Beach, or Dallas, or New York. So, if players toil for years to get to get to free agency, to get to a point where they can create a bidding war for their services, it begs my wife’s question: Why do teams bother giving raises?

A quick primer: The typical baseball player is under “team control” for six years (sometimes less, sometimes more, let’s not busy ourselves with those distinctions). For the first three seasons he is under contract, the team is required to pay him the major league minimum ($570,500 in 2021). After seasons three through five, he either negotiates a new agreement with the team or goes to arbitration and pleads his case. After season six, he is a free agent and can go wherever he desires. But every year players are tendered contracts for their second and third seasons with raises built in. Not substantial raises, but usually in the 5-10% range. I imagine we all would be quite happy with raises of 5-10% in a given year. But, again, why do teams do this?

At first blush, one might think that giving a player a raise in Year 2 and/or Year 3 is a reward for a job well done. And nominally, that is what it is. But is there any other point in a player’s career where ownership provides more than what is contractually required (either collectively or individually)? Shohei Ohtani just won the MVP award, banging out an 8.1 fWAR season. According to a 2020 article from FanGraphs, each point of WAR was worth $8M. That number varies on a season-by-season basis, but let’s use that as a basis. According to that metric, Ohtani was worth $64.8M to the Angels last season. Now, one can quibble about paying players on a per-WAR basis. But, one cannot quibble with the idea that Ohtani was worth more to the Angels than the $4.25M the team paid him last season. Near as I can tell, Ohtani doesn’t have any contractual bonuses for receiving any awards. Despite his brilliance and the historic nature of his 2021 season, the Angels will pay him the same $4.25M next year. Why? Because that is what is in his contract; that is all that is required. There will be no “atta boy” 5-10% pay raise for Ohtani in 2022.

We could do the same analysis for hundreds of other players who out-performed their contracts, and yet will not get any raise for their efforts. Players in their first three years of service time are subject to the whims and generosity of their organizations. And, judging from baseball’s middle class and the fact that the owners just locked out the players and issued Kremlin-level propaganda about their decision, it is fair to say that players are not often the recipients of teams’ largesse. So, if teams rarely (if ever) give away anything they don’t have to, why do they (seemingly) always give a raise for Year 2 and Year 3?

Just to put a finer point on it, according to the glossary at MLB.com, “Clubs may choose to sign their pre-arbitration players to one-year deals for more than the Major League minimum to build goodwill for future negotiations, but they are under no obligation to do so.” Which got me thinking: Does buying goodwill ever pay off? How often do player reward their teams by staying with them upon reaching free agency?

Going back to 2015-2016 off-season, I tracked the top twenty free agents for each season, then narrowed the analysis to include only players who spent all (or most) of their pre-free agency years with their original club. These players got the minimum, then got raises for Years 2 and 3, and then did what? Let’s take a look:

Ian Desmond: He played with the Nationals from 2009-2015. When he became a free agent in 2016, he left for the Rangers.

Chris Davis: Davis actually played 193 with the Rangers before being traded to the Orioles, so he isn’t a perfect comp. But since he received a raise from the Orioles in Year 3, and then went through three years of arbitration with the club, it still works. Davis rewarded (?) the O’s by sticking with the club, and signing one of the worst deals in baseball history (7/$161M, which netted the Orioles a total of -2.8 bWAR before Davis retired in the middle of the 2021 season). I am guessing Baltimore wished they hadn’t earned such goodwill.

Jason Castro: He came up with Astros, earned the minimum, and got raises in Year 2 and 3. As soon as he became a free agent, he bolted for the Twins.

Kenley Jansen: Kenley came up with the Dodgers, went through the paces, and then signed a 5/$80M deal. So either the early-year raises paid off, or the $16M/year moved the needle. One will never know.

Wilson Ramos: Was drafted by the Twins, but got traded to the Nationals before he reached the majors. Once he became a free agent, he signed with the Rays.

Eric Hosmer: This may the poster-child for goodwill not being rewarded. Hosmer was drafted third overall by Kansas City in 2008, worked his way through the minors, and began his career at Kaufman Stadium. He received a raise before Year 2, which earned enough goodwill for him to sign three pre-arbitration contracts of $3.6M, $13.9M, and $12.25M. Then he took a $17.4M Qualifying Offer. As a free agent, Hosmer shunned the Royals’ 7/$147M offer to take an 8/$144M deal with the Padres. If it looks like he took a worse deal, that’s because he did. Do you think the Royals might want those raises back?

Lorenzo Cain: Fellow Royal Lorenzo Cain was originally drafted by the Brewers, he played 43 games with the team before being traded to Kansas City. He received raises in Years 2 and 3, and then went back to Milwaukee the first chance he could – when he reached free agency.

George Springer: He came up through the Astros system, won a World Series, and then left the country to sign with the Blue Jays as soon as he had the chance.

DJ LeMahieu: After a cup of coffee with the Cubs, LeMahieu spent his formative years with the Rockies. He reached free agency, took the Yankees’ money, and ran.

AJ Pollock: Pollock came up with the Diamondbacks, took their raises, and then left for the division rival Dodgers once he became a free agent.

Corey Seager: For Dodger fans, it is hard for them to imagine Corey in any other uniform. He was the future. Well, he was until we wasn’t…when he reached free agency and quickly signed a massive 10/$325M deal with the Rangers.

Eduardo Rodriguez: He got two raises, signed three one-year deals, and went to arbitration once with the Red Sox. When he became a free agent, he immediately signed with the Tigers.

Carlos Correa: Time will tell if Correa rewards the Astros for their largesse, but the tea leaves are not pointing in that direction.

Trevor Story: Will Story remain a Rockie? I wouldn’t count on it. Story expected to be traded at the 2021 deadline, and it seems his bags are already packed for parts and teams unknown.

There are, of course, many more players we could analyze, some of whom stayed with their clubs. But, the vast majority of those were because they had no other options. Kenley Jansen and Chris Davis both of whom took massive deals to stay with the original clubs, may be the exceptions that prove the rule. Giving players raises for Years 2 and 3 doesn’t seem to buy (the team) anything. As Bob Sugar so aptly puts it, “It’s not show Friends, it’s show business.” And as these examples prove, goodwill cannot be bought with $25-$50K raises. Which brings us back to the bar and to my wife’s question: Why do teams ever give players a raise?

The answer, unfortunately, is the same as why they changed the formula to Coke: No one knows.

PLAY BALL!!

All I Want for Christmas

It’s that time of the year when champions are crowned and parades are held; when Christmas tree lots spring up seemingly out of nowhere; and stoves get hot. And sure, the stoves may stay tepid this off-season with impending expiration of the current CBA and the expected lockout in December, but that doesn’t mean we, as baseball fans, can’t speculate and create our wish lists.

I, like most of you, am a fanatic baseball fan. And I, like you, follow the sport all year round. But, possibly even more than being a fan of baseball, I am a fan of nostalgia, and origin stories, and people coming home and old friends getting together once again. And this year, with so many free agents with so many compelling possibilities and so many teams with obvious needs, it would be nice if they were all paired with happy endings. So, when I head to my local mall and climb up onto Santa’s lap (does this still happen in a post-Covid world?), here is what I will be wishing for.

Max Scherzer and Justin Verlander are reunited in Detroit. The poor Motor City deserves something to smile about (non-Miguel Cabrera division). After the Malice at the Palace and Darko Miličić, after settling for Jared Goff, after the hollowing out of the rust belt, it would be great if Tigers fans had something great to root for, again. None of Aníbal Sánchez, Doug Fister, or Rick Porcello are available, but no matter. The Tigers have a young crop of power arms (which now includes Eduardo Rodriguez) who could learn at the hip of these aging (but not yet aged) veterans both of whom still have plenty in the tank.

Kris Bryant heads to the City of Brotherly Love to join his fellow Las Vegan, Bryce Harper. According to FanGraphs Roster Resource Depth Chart, the Phillies plan to have Adam Haseley (.190/.190/.238) in left field and Alex Bohm (.247/.305/.342) at third base. Tell me that Bryant isn’t a better option at either position. And with Andrew McCutchen gone, and Nate Fassnacht seemingly ready to get a cup of coffee at either third or in left, Bryant provides a great deal of flexibility.

Javy Báez stays in New York, keeping the Lindor-Báez double-play combo intact. These two are old friends, playing with and against each other on the fields of Puerto Rico, and on the Puerto Rican national team in the World Baseball Classic. Keeping them together will allow them to get past the thumbs down kerfuffle, and could create the most exciting up the middle duo since Omar Vizquel and Roberto Alomar (Cleveland, 1999-2001). Of course, the Mets will need someone in the front office to actually sign Báez, so this may take a while.

The Seager Brothers – Corey and Kyle – head to the Bronx. Sure, the Yankees may be fitted at third base with DJ LeMahieu, but he could easily slide over to first base, splitting time with Luke Voit, while the Brothers Seager handle the left side of the infield. Corey is perfectly suited for Yankee Stadium and its short porch in right, and the Yankees desperately need more left-handed hitting. Both Kyle and Corey grew up Yankee fans idolizing Derek Jeter. Is there a better coda for the Seager boys than taking over the position Jeter played and the position to which he should have moved later in his career?

Oakland needs to resign Marcus Semien. Has there ever been a more perfect Oakland A? Semien grew up in the Bay Area, turned down a draft offer to go to Cal Berkeley, where both of his parents went. He was nothing less than solid for the green and gold from 2015 through 2020. Unfortunately, his breakout 2021 season may have priced him out of Oakland’s market. But if anyone would be willing to take a literal hometown discount, it would seem Semien is the ideal candidate.

Speaking of hometown discounts, if the Braves do anything this winter other than finding the perfect place to display their World Series trophy, it is to resign Freddie Freeman. It is not truly a “hometown” insofar as Freddie is from Southern California, but has anyone since Chipper Jones more/better represented the city of Atlanta and this team? Could you imagine Freddie in any other uniform? He could probably play for another ten years; but even if he can’t, there will be value in having him around the team, at Spring Training, in the press box, well into his 40’s. It might require that the team to break the bank, it might require some additional year ingenuity, and it might require Freddie backing off what he could get from, say, the Rangers, to be in Atlanta on opening day to collect his World Series ring, and to never have to buy a drink in that town again. But there are enough smart people in this equation to figure it all out.

Speaking of players never to be seen in another uniform, and as I have previously written, the Dodgers MUST resign Clayton Kershaw. I don’t care how many years it takes – remember co-owner Magic Johnson once signed a 25-year player/personal services agreement with the Lakers – but something needs to be worked out. My thoughts about this are written in more detail here.

Like Semien, I want Kyle Schwarber to go home again and play for the Guardians. The Middletown, Ohio native, who played his college ball in Indiana and his formative baseball seasons in Chicago, needs to keep his midwest roots and, like Chrissie Hynde, he needs to go back to Ohio. Franmil Reyes probably has the DH slot filled, but Schwarber showed this year that he could be serviceable at either first base or in left field. And with an off-season to work on his infield skills, he even could become average. What is not average is his bat. This season he had a 148 OPS+, with a career OPS+ of 119. He is an on base machine, and makes every clubhouse a better, happier place. In the 2016 World Series, Schwarber went 7-16 at Progressive Field; and for his career, he has a .364/.417/.788 slash line with 4 home runs while playing the “The Jake.”

With Báez in New York, Bryant in Philly, and Schwarber in Cleveland, Anthony Rizzo needs to go back to the Cubs. He belongs there. He is an institution there. Enough with the Yankee pinstripes and the #48. He and Jed Hoyer have been together from the Red Sox to the Padres to the Cubs. And while there will no more “Bryzzo” t-shirts for sale on Waveland Avenue, they will sell plenty of #44 jerseys. His easy smile, smooth glove, and ferocious bat play well on the North Side. And Rizzo doesn’t have any of the service-time manipulation baggage that Bryant carries. The Cubs deserve Rizzo, but more importantly, the Cubs’ fans deserve Rizzo.

And speaking of teams and communities deserving of a player, let’s end this with Chris Taylor going back to Seattle.The Mariners fans never got a chance to witness CT3 in full, with 86 total games and only 68 hits in his 2+ seasons there. But they have witnessed him – from afar – grow up, and they have seen the player that he has become, on the biggest of stages. With the Dodgers, Taylor has shown his versatility, playing above-average all over the diamond. With Kyle Seager gone, Taylor could become an everyday third baseman. Or he may be an even better option at second base than Dylan Moore. Or he could play a different position every day. It doesn’t matter, insofar as Taylor has shown over the past four seasons that any team is better when he is on the field.

That’s it, Santa. That is all I want for Christmas. That, and for the owners and players to come to a quick resolution so we don’t have a protracted labor battle; and that spring training and the season start on time. That’s not too much to ask, is it?

PLAY BALL!!

Rooting for the B-Student

Forget the “banging scheme” or the alleged buzzers or the “it’s my time gestures”, forget Ken Lay and Enron Field, forget Yuli Gurriel’s racist dugout impressions. I am rooting for the Braves in this World Series because I see myself in that team. I was an 88-win student in high school, in college, and in law school. I started slow – albeit better than .500 (or C-level) for more than the first half – but was never in the upper echelon. No one ever looked at my report cards and thought “potential pennant winner” or “one game from capturing the World Series”. No, they saw a student who did fine, even well sometimes. Sure, I was someone who would easily graduate each institution, and find gainful employment, but I was no juggernaut; I wasn’t a 95-game winner (let alone a 107-game winner). I played in the right division and did enough to make it to the next round. And then I flourished; took what I had learned, added a few new skillsets, and rode those to new heights. I allowed my performance on the field (or, more accurately, in the workplace) to speak for more than my middling 88-win academic credentials.

It is easy to root for the sensation, the 2001 Mariners and their 116 wins. Or the Yankees or Dodgers nearly every year. And, of course, I cheered on my beloved Red Sox when they won 108 games in 2018. But it isn’t the same as rooting for the almost dregs, like the 2006 Cardinals. It would be generous to say that that Cardinals team limped in the playoffs and then caught fire. On September 19, 2006, the Red Birds throttled the Brewers 12-2, to move eleven games over .500. They then went 3-9 over their last twelve, which included a seven-game losing streak, to finish 83-78. But that team was more than their GPA. They went on to beat the Padres three games to one in the NLDS, and the 97-win Mets in seven games in the NLCS. That 83-win team then beat the 95-win Tigers in five to capture another World Series. Not bad for a B-student team and their .516 winning percentage.

As has been written in various and sundry places, this year’s Braves took longer to reach .500 than any other World Series team ever. But the team they were is not the team they are. As has been reported ad nauseum, president of baseball operations Alex Anthopoulos reworked the Braves outfield after losing Marcel Ozuna to bad sliding and bad life decisions, and Ronald Acuña, Jr. to a torn ACL. Over the course of two weeks, Anthopoulos acquired Joc Pederson from the Cubs, Adam Duvall from the Marlins, Jorge Soler from the Royals, and NLCS hero Eddie Rosario from the Guardians née Indians. From July 31^st to the end of the season, the Braves had the best record in baseball (37-19). But unlike the 2006 Cardinals, the Hammers (one can hope, right?) went 12-2 heading into the playoffs. With that momentum, they beat the Brewers in four and the heavily-favored Dodgers in six, and then jumped out to a 3-1 lead against (say it again) the heavily-favored Astros. And yet, as of this writing, the Braves remain one win away from getting that piece of metal for the first time since 1995.

Sure, listening to the Atlanta (suburbs) crowd drone on with their tomahawk chant is annoying at best and incredibly offensive at worst, and watching the former president sit in one of the Braves’ luxury boxes was somewhat disconcerting. But those are not reason enough not to cheer for the team who overcame mediocrity to get to the precipice of glory. Root for Pederson’s pearls and Rosario’s beard; root for Brian Snitker’s 41 years in/with the organization and Freddie Freeman’s, well, everything. Root for the team whose Game 4 starter had never started a MLB game before that night, got only one out, and yet still won. Root for the Astros to lose a second World Series in three years in their home park. Root for the B-student to achieve success, because we can’t all be valedictorian, we can’t all go to Harvard, we can’t all win 95 games. Sometimes, we need to do just enough, get hot, and ride the wave.

PLAY BALL!!

The Season of Second-Guessing

I guess it’s that time of the year. The leaves turn, the temperatures drop, the intensity heightens, and everyone becomes an expert. Fans have watched their team play for six months, they know their favorite roster backwards and forwards; they even know their opponents strengths and weaknesses. So, from the comfort of their couch, the typical fan –with beer in one hand and remote in the other – grunts, groans, and generally grumbles about the pre-game and in-game decision-making processes.

Take my son, for instance. Sitting behind the Red Sox dugout last Friday night in Houston, my son could not and would not stop lamenting Alex Cora’s decision to use Hirokazu Sawamura in the eighth inning of Game of the ALCS. In retrospect, and in terms of outcome, my son was correct. But, as I explained to him as we walked out of the ballpark, we simply had NO idea what Cora or pitching coach Dave Bush or anyone else in that dugout was considering when that decision was made. As a side note, I told him that one of the downsides of attending the game is that we miss out on the analysis you get from Ken Rosenthal and Ron Darling and Frenchy Francoeur, which is all that more important in the playoffs.

My final comment, as he hung his head and headed to the hotel, was that, at that moment, Cora had managed this team for 168 games, and was 15-5 as a post-season skipper. So, for some reason, I tend to trust his knowledge of the Red Sox pitching staff more than my own, and more than that of my 18-year-old son. He reluctantly mumbled his agreement.

And then there is (at least in my world) the much-maligned Dave Roberts. Depending on who I am talking to, or when, Roberts is either a front-office puppet or an over-manager who makes too many bad decisions. Try as I might, I have been unable to square that circle. To that end, I cannot recall how many texts I received last week when the Dodgers announced Corey Knebel as the NLDS Game 5 starter. “Roberts is screwing up again” my father wrote to me shortly after the lineup was released. My best friend sent an SOS text asking for an explanation. I tried to calmly explain to both – and others – that this was not just Dave Roberts’ call. He didn’t wake up Thursday morning, throw a thumb to the wind, and decide Knebel was his guy. I knew, in my soul, and as someone who follows baseball closely, that this was a whole-of-organization determination. And, much to my chagrin, Buster Olney didn’t help matters on Friday morning’s Baseball Tonight podcast, stating that if the Dodgers had lost, or if Knebel had given up a bunch of runs, Roberts would have had a lot to answer for. Thankfully, his guest, Karl Ravech, quickly made my point, and explained to both Buster and the listening audience that this wasn’t a one-man show.

And thank goodness for Andy McCullough of The Athletic. On Friday morning, he published a behind-the-scenes account of how and why the Dodgers decided to go with the opener in Game 5. I sent the article to my dad under the heading “As I was saying…” My father read it, and wrote me back: “After reading the backstory on the pitching strategy, it was genius. Wow!”

The point is, we – as fans – in the grand scheme of things, don’t know shit. We have more information at our fingertips than at any time in history. We subscribe to FanGraphs and check Baseball Reference each morning. We read Jayson Stark’s Weird & Wild column religiously, and listen to Buster and umpteen other baseball podcasts. We have fantasy teams and keeper leagues, and follow the goings-on in the Arizona Fall League. And yet, we have no idea who’s arm is dead, or who didn’t sleep the night before because his baby is sick, or who looked awkward walking back from the clubhouse. We don’t have a fraction of the analytics, advanced statistics, and player-by-player match-up information that each team loads onto those dugout iPads. We don’t know what Dave Roberts or Alex Cora or Brian Snitker or Dusty Baker know. We haven’t experienced what they have experienced. So, arm-chair Connie Mack, slow your roll.

All of that said, it doesn’t mean that managers can’t be and shouldn’t be second (and third) guessed. They can and they should. In fact, that is part of what makes being a fan so much fun. Managers make decisions nearly every night that confound not just us fans, but their front offices as well. And they don’t always do a very good job of explaining themselves. But the system is pretty much self-correcting: make too many of those bad calls, and they become former managers.

Tim Kurkjian has oftentimes repeated the advice that Buck Showalter once told him: a bad outcome doesn’t necessarily mean a bad process; and a good outcome doesn’t necessarily mean a good process. So, it might make sense to be a bit more judicious in our criticisms. We should probably give managers – especially those who have (repeatedly) made it to the final four – the benefit of the doubt before we chuck them under the team bus.

For instance, I have to believe there is some explanation as to why Roberts pulled Brusdar Graterol after nine (100 MPH) pitches to bring in Kenley Jansen to face Eddie Rosario in the ninth inning of Game 2. Brian Anderson opined on the telecast that he didn’t want to be like the aforementioned Buck Showalter, losing a playoff game with his closer in the pen. Fair enough, but from my couch, it seemed like a shaky move. And until Roberts tells me more, until he explains what he and his coaches saw and knew, until he conveys what information was contained on that iPad, you can bet I will second-guess that decision. And if/when he does, I will go back to thinking that the guy who has won six division titles, two pennants, and one ring is pretty good at his job.

Second guess with impunity, but do so with humility.

PLAY BALL!!

The Man Before “The Man” – The Walk Before the Trot

Lost in the hullabaloo of huge walk-off home runs are the little things immediately preceding that make them possible. Watching the Dodgers-Cardinals game last week, I had an incredible flashback that I don’t believe was discussed on the broadcast.

Ranked the No. 1 sports moment in the history of Los Angeles sports, Kirk Gibson’s walk-off two-run home run against the Oakland A’s in the opener of the 1988 World Series was truly something to behold. And when reliving the event with the nearly ten minute clip on YouTube (as I have done countless times), we almost forget the five-pitch walk Mike Davis earned before Gibby hobbled his way out of the dugout.

Mike Davis is a footnote in baseball lore. He played 10 seasons in the big leagues, eight with his opponent that night, the A’s. In 1988 with the Dodgers, he walked only 25 times in 310 plate appearances. As such, he certainly wasn’t the ideal choice when needing a baserunner in the bottom of the ninth. In fact, it bears asking if he was actually a better option than Alfredo Griffin (for whom he pinch hit), with his .199 batting average and .259 on-base percentage.

Davis has a pretty brutal ’88 season, and the Dodgers limited him to 103 plate appearances in the second half. At season’s end, he sported a .196 batting average, and a .260 OBP with just nine walks after May. But manager Tommy Lasorda called his number in the ninth inning of Game 1 of the World Series, with the directive to find a way on base so someone, anyone, could try to drive him in. Davis worked a five-pitch walk off Dennis Eckersley, a pitcher who issued a mere 11 walks in 72 2/3 innings that season.

But Davis wasn’t done. With the crowd going wild and Gibson fouling off pitches like the battered horse that he was, Davis swiped second base. This was important for a multitude of reasons, not the least of which was that now any Texas Leaguer, duck fart, or blooper over short would have at least tied the game (note, in Gibson’s condition, any ground ball in the infield – and maybe a shallow grounder to the outfield – would have resulted in an out at first to end the game). Also, in the years before multiple sets of signs, and quarterback-type wristbands, and back-pocket information cards, and center-field cameras relayed to dugout monitors, it was still to the batter’s advantage to have a runner on second base.

Of course, it is well-documented that the Dodgers had a pre-series scouting report that Eck would go to the backdoor slider on a 3-2 count, so it is unknown how helpful Davis’ positioning at second base may have been. Regardless, Davis was inexplicably on base representing the tying run when there was “a fly ball to right field…”

Which brings me to last Wednesday night, in that same ballpark. Mike Davis was never the caliber of player that Cody Bellinger is. Cody has won Rookie of the Year and MVP awards. He is a two-time All-Star who has hit 47 dingers in a single season. But 2021 has been, in a word, a disaster for Cody. He played in 95 games, struck out three times as often as he walked, and had a .240 OBP. If not for the injury to Max Muncy on the last day of the year, it is highly likely that Bellinger wouldn’t have even been in the lineup in the Wild Card Game against the Cardinals. And yet, there he was.

So with the stage set for Albert Pujols to hit a pinch-hit, walk-off homer against his former club, he merely lined out to center. When Steven Souza Jr. did the same, it was up to Bellinger to keep this contest from going to extra innings. In August of this year, Bellinger had two walks in 93 plate appearances. He improved that a bit in September and October, with five in 59. But he hadn’t walked twice in a game since June 24, and seeing how he had already received a free pass in the third inning, another one didn’t seem likely.

Shockingly, after swinging through a 2-1 sinker, Bellinger took two sinkers just off the plate to earn the walk. There wasn’t a Dodgers fan in attendance, nor one watching on television, who wasn’t certain that Belly would swing through at least one of those pitches — but he didn’t.

Like Mike Davis, Bellinger found a way to get on. And then, like Davis, he stole second base.

Bellinger had previously swiped two bags in a game three times in his career: once in 2017, once in 2018, and then last September. But here he stole his second base of the night, and he did it with two outs in the bottom of the ninth inning of a win-or-go-home game in October. And in doing so, like Davis, he put himself in scoring position (this time for a chance to win, rather than just tie).

We will all remember Chris Taylor’s line shot into the left-field pavilion to propel the Dodgers to the next round of the playoffs. It wasn’t Gibby. But it may have scooted in front of Muncy and Justin Turner in the annals of celebrated Dodger moments. CT3 walked off the Cardinals and gave the Dodgers the Wild Card Game victory. But lest we forget, as so many have since 1988, it was the little noted two-out walk, and the subsequent stolen base, that truly set the stage. A tip of the cap to Davis and Bellinger, whose keen eyes and fleet feet paved the way for legends to be born.

PLAY BALL!!